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Few issues are more contentious for local communities than industrial pollution.  When local 
industries pollute, lawmakers and regulators must balance two primary concerns: economic 
prosperity and the environment.  The role of political pressure is well-documented in 
environmental policy.  What is less clear is the role jurisdictional or boundary considerations play 
in determining the implementation of environmental laws.  Anecdotal evidence suggests that local 
regulators are more lenient in their treatment of polluters when the incidence of pollution falls 
partially on those outside the state.  One explanation for such behavior is that regulators take 
actions to maximize political support.  This paper tests this jurisdictional model using Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI) data from 1987 to 1996.  We find that facilities’ emissions into the air and 
water are systematically higher in counties that border other states.  These results are consistent 
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1. Introduction 
In 1983 the state of Tennessee sued the state of North Carolina charging that it had allowed 
a Canton, North Carolina paper mill to violate the Clean Water Act.
1  Tennessee claimed that the 
primary reason for its neighbor’s inaction was the mill’s close proximity to the state line (Bartlett 
1985:105); in this case, the location of the Champion Internationals mill was on the Pigeon River 
twenty-six miles upstream from the Tennessee border.  This was not the first time state regulators 
had been accused of giving lenient treatment to polluters located on or near a state border.  In 1987 
the Supreme Court heard arguments in a case involving New Hampshire and Vermont (Bartlett 
1995).
2  In both situations, a neighboring state alleged that another state’s regulators had enforced 
national pollution laws less stringently, usually by grandfathering high emission levels at older 
facilities, in order to protect state resident’s income rather than reduce pollution that largely 
affected nonresidents.  A similar debate has taken place over acid rain and other types of air 
pollution (Novello (1992)). 
Few issues are more contentious for local communities than industrial pollution.  When 
local industries pollute lawmakers and regulators must balance two primary concerns: economic 
prosperity and the environment.  The role of political pressure is well-documented in 
environmental policy (Oates (2001), Magat, et al. (1986), Hird (1990)).  In general the theory 
suggests that local control is at least as efficient as any other political jurisdiction in dealing with 
local pollution simply because the median voter receives both the costs and benefits of the policy.  
What is less clear is the role jurisdictional or boundary considerations play in determining the 
enforcement of environmental laws.  As Oates (2001) explains the strongest case for national 
standards exists when local public goods (in this case environmental protection) have spillover 
                                                                 
1 State of Tennessee v. Champion International Corporation. 709 S.W. 2d 569 (Tenn. 1986), April 21, 1986.   3 
effects in other jurisdictions.  Theoretically at least this can lead to a “race to the bottom.”
 3  There 
is some evidence that suggests that local regulators are more lenient in their treatment of polluters 
when the incidence of pollution falls not on state residents but on those outside the state.  For 
example, Novello (1992) finds that regulatory stringency is lax when emissions of volatile or 
organic compounds (VOCs) or nitrogen oxides affect downwind states.  Deyle and Bretschneider 
(1995) show that, in the case of New York hazardous waste production, differing regulations 
between jurisdictions caused a shifting of risk.  Sigman (2000), in a recent paper, finds a 40% 
increase in pollution in rivers near international borders. 
An explanation for this behavior is that regulators take actions to maximize political support 
(Magat, et al. 1986).  The costs and benefits associated with the regulators’ actions are assumed to 
produce responses from external actors.  The political jurisdiction in which constituents reside will 
dictate, in part, a regulator’s behavior.  The stringency of pollution abatement will vary with the 
number of the state’s residents (or voters) who are affected by this pollution.  This does not mean 
that all border communities go unprotected but that border facilities will be less stringently 
regulated than are plants in the interior of the state. 
This paper tests a jurisdictional model using Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) data from 
1987 to 1996.  The analysis uses establishment-level data form the TRI.  The dependent variable is 
the emission level by TRI facilities (using several standard measures in the TRI) between 1987 and 
1996.  These results have potentially important implications for regulatory federalism. Specifically 
we find systematic evidence of free riding by jurisdictions when pollution can be more easily 
exported to neighboring states. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
2 International Paper Co. v. Harmel Ouelette, et al. 107 S. Ct. 805 (1987).   4 
The paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we present a model of the political 
determinants of pollution standards.  In section 3 we discuss the data.  In section 4 we discuss the 
econometric issues involved in estimating the model.  In section 5 we present the results and 
section 6 offers some concluding remarks. 
2. The Model 
  We start with one of the simplest models of environmental federalism to motivate the 
specification that follows in section 4.
 4  We modify Magat, et al.’s (1986) external signals model 
by introducing an export parameter to capture the proportion of pollution that remains in the 
jurisdiction.
5  The resulting model, as constructed, is similar to Weingast, et al.’s model of 
federalism (1981). 
A jurisdiction contains n citizens and m firms.  The Magat model posits that regulators set 
the stringency of environmental regulations, s, to maximize the sum of external support M (or 
minimize opposition); for example, s=0 is a complete elimination of the hazard.  The total damage 
each citizen suffers from the pollution allowed by that standard is  () vs; harm is assumed to 
increase at an increasing rate ( ()0 vs ¢ >  and  ()0 vs ¢¢ > ).  The representative citizen’s (or median 
voter) probability of sending a positive (supportive) signal is  (()) fvs ; the probability of support 
from individuals is assumed to be decreasing and concave in harm ( (())0;(())0 fvsfvs ¢¢¢ << ).  The 
firm’s probability of opposition is  ((/)) htsm , where  (/) tsmis the representative firm’s cost of 
compliance.  Compliance costs are assumed to decrease in s (less stringent standards) at an 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
3 Baron (1985), for example, shows that national regulation can improve social welfare because local regulation is 
subject to jurisdictional problems.  Ingberman (1995) shows that the location of hazardous waste facilities depends 
critically on jurisdiction. 
4 Oates (2001) is an excellent survey of the various models and their predictions. 
5 Magat, et al.’s (1986) model is based on Peltzman’s (1976) model of political competition.  The interpretation in 
Magat, et al. – support maximization by regulators rather than vote maximization by elected officials – makes the 
model somewhat different.   5 
increasing rate ( (/)0;(/)0 tsmtsm ¢¢¢ <> ); the probability of industry opposition increases in 
compliance cost at an increasing rate ( ()0;()0 htht ¢¢¢ >> ).  The relative strength of the industry’s 
signal is e.  We include the proportion (a ) of the total harm (v(s)) that affects local residents in the 
regulator’s jurisdiction.  As a approaches 1, less pollution is exported to non-residents.
6  A 
national regulator who values all voters equally would set a pollution level would account for the 
harm done to all voters ( 1 a = ).   
The local regulator’s objective function is to maximize  
[()][(/)] Mnfvsmehtsm a =- .        (1) 
The first order necessary condition for  * s  is 
[(*)](*)[(*/)](*/)0 nfvsvsmehtsmtsm aa ¢¢¢¢ -= .        (2) 
The total differential
7 of (2) with respect to s is 
22 ()((1/))0 nfvvfehtmht aa ¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢¢ +-+< .          (3) 
The total differential of (2) with respect to a  is 
0 nfv ¢¢< .          (4) 






.  As expected, 
an increase in the proportion of pollution damage that is inflicted on local residents causes a 
reduction in the allowed level of pollution.  Figure 1 shows the intuition of the model.  As 
incidence increases, the pollution damage causes more harm to the regulator’s base of support and 
so his marginal political support curve shifts to the right relative to the case where  1 a = .  Second, 
as the lower panel of Figure 1 indicates, neither the national standard  F s  ( 1 a =  by definition) nor 
                                                                 
6 In Magat, et al. (1986) thea parameter is labeled p and is included as a shift parameter measuring the impact of 
changes in pollution damage on s.  We have changed the name to reflect change in interpretation.   6 
the local (export) standard  L s  are systematically related to the efficient standard  E s ; we do not 
know if local control is more or less efficient.  Table 1 presents the other comparative statics. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
[Insert Table 1 about here.] 
There are alternative models that suggest that the equalization of pollution incidence across 
jurisdictions.  For example, the Coase Theorem (1960) suggests that if transaction costs were low 
enough cross-border pollution issues could be solved.  However, there is every reason to believe 
that borders between jurisdictions create high transaction costs.  Jurisdictions complicate 
information problems in that the two political jurisdictions must share information in order to 
attribute pollution to potential emitters (Fesler 1949).  For example, if a plant on one side of the 
state line and a plant on the other side both pollute the same river the downstream regulator would 
need to know the emission levels at the first plant to attribute responsibility to the second plant.  
Although there are many reasons, the basic prediction of the literature is that pollution levels will 
be higher if the incidence of pollution falls on residence of another state. 
3.  Data 
3.1 Dependent variables and hypothesis 
Our test environment for this hypothesis is the emission of toxic pollutants by 
manufacturing and other establishments in the United States.  Our data source is the Environmental 
Protection Agency’s Toxic Release Inventory (TRI) for the years 1987 to 1996.
8  The 1984 Bhopal, 
India disaster heightened awareness of toxic emissions and aided, directly or indirectly, the creation 
of the 1986 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA), which requires 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
7 The comparative statics are given in Magat, et al. (1986:61-63).  We refer the reader to Magat, et al. for a derivation 
of the other derivatives.   7 
disclosure of over six hundred designated toxic chemicals.  The TRI tracks emission levels for all 
establishments producing more than 25,000 pounds of any toxic chemical.  Our dependent 
variables are the amounts released for a reporting facility by four specific pathways for a given 
year.   
Our primary variable of interest is an establishment’s border status as a measure of the 
proportion (a ) of the establishment’s waste that impacts local residents.  We classify every county 
as being a border county or non-border county; a border county shares a border with another state, 
Mexico, or Canada.  This coding scheme corresponds with the finding that people’s aversion to 
hazardous wastes declines with distance (Mitchell and Carson 1986).  When a polluting facility is 
located in the interior of a state (i.e., the larger the proportion of overall pollution produced inside 
the state), an in-state resident’s utility will be lower and the utility of a neighboring state’s resident 
will be higher.  Further, we classify the county as an ocean county if it borders an ocean or one of 
the Great Lakes.  Because the model indicates that exportability increases pollution levels 
regardless of whether it is fish or people receiving the pollution, we expect pollution levels are 
higher when bordering an ocean. 
Our four pollution pathways are air, water, and land releases and the quantity shipped off-
site to treatment, storage and disposal (TSD) facilities within the state (land emissions includes on-
site storage in a lagoon or treatment pond).  We disaggregate the pathways because the model’s 
predictions should differ by pathway.  Both land and off-site transfers affect residents less in a 
neighboring county than would air or water emissions.  Even if spillovers from storage facilities 
(usually ponds) or accidents in off-site transfers affect out-of-state residents, the relative magnitude 
should be smaller because these types of accidents are rare events.  Spillovers are generally fairly 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
8 While there has been some concern that the first two years of TRI data are censored at high levels of emissions   8 
localized, and shipments often cross great distances so accidents would be no more likely to affect 
neighboring state residents if they originated in a border county.  Thus, land emissions and off-site 
in-state transfers serve as explicit comparison measures for air and water emissions.  We expect 
that facilities in border counties will be marked by elevated pollution levels for the latter two 
measures because of the greater possibility of migration. 
Additionally, we carry out several extensions of the model.  Because we do not know the 
direction of the air or water flow and releases from a border-county plant, which might traverse the 
state, we examine counties on the eastern edge of the state.  According to the model, air emissions 
should be higher in these counties than for the entire population of border counties because 
prevailing winds increase the likelihood that air emissions from eastern edge counties will be 
deposited in the neighboring state.  However, we note that not knowing if emissions flow directly 
into the next state tends to bias our initial coefficient estimates toward zero.  Our estimates are 
lower bounds. 
In the second extension, we address the proposition, raised particularly with maquiladores 
factories, that pollution abatement efforts are lower at international borders.  Our second extension 
includes estimating the model excluding counties bordering Mexico and, in a second set of 
regressions, Canada or Mexico.  Last, we also address the fact that U.S. counties vary greatly in 
size; western counties are much larger than eastern ones.  While this is partially accounted for by 
our estimation technique, we also estimate the model by EPA region. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(Levinson 1999), our results are not sensitive to their inclusion.   9 
3.2 Control Variables 
Previous studies and our theoretical model motivate our control variables.
9  First, we 
include the population of the county (in the theoretical model, n).  The model predicts that 
increases in population will cause decreases in pollution.  Second, to capture the likelihood that 
residents will send a positive signal in response to a given level of pollution ( () f ￿ ) we include the 
county in which the facility is resides’ per capita income, the percent of the county population in 
poverty, and the percent of the county population who are black, Hispanic or Native American, and 
the unemployment rate for the county.
10  The model predicts that factors that increase the 
probability of positive signal will reduce pollution.  Thus we predict that increased income reduces 
pollution while communities with higher poverty rates and minority communities are less likely to 
signal.  Because unemployment raises the cost of signaling the regulator (due to the implicit job 
search), we predict higher unemployment rates cause higher rates of pollution. Third, we include 
the population density as a measure of  () v ￿ , the damage caused by allowing a given pollution level, 
s.  We predict that increased population density causes decreased pollution.   
Some care should be taken in interpreting the link between demographic characteristics and 
the model.  It is possible, even in the panel context discussed below, that the causation on the 
demographic variables runs in the opposite direction.  That is, rather than counties with a high 
poverty rate, for example, being less politically active and hence having higher levels of pollution 
in their community in fact the higher pollution levels may cause wealthier people to leave the 
community and hence the remaining population has a higher poverty level. Since our primary focus 
                                                                 
9 See for example Hird (1990), Hamilton (1993 and 1995), Gray and Deily (1996), Helland (1998) and Arora and 
Cason (1999) among others, who find that local communities can be important in determining the level of pollution 
emitted from a facility. 
10 The poverty and minority percentages are not available for all years and we linearly interpolate the missing values.  
The results are robust to using the value for the closest year as well.   10 
is not the link between pollution and the demographics of the local community we simply estimate 
a reduced form equation. 
We also include measures related to the environment of the establishments on which our 
model centers.  We include the number of manufacturing establishments as our measure of m in the 
model.  The comparative statics in Table 1 indicate that the greater the number of firms the higher 
the pollution levels allowed per firm.  As a measure of the probability a firm will oppose an 
allowed pollution level,  () h ￿ , we include the percentage of firms with fewer than ten employees; 
we expect that lobbying is costly to small firms and so the higher the percentage of small firms in 
the lower the allowed pollution level.  As a measure of e, the relative signal strength, we include 
the number of employees in manufacturing.  We believe that e is the relative size of those harmed 
by pollution to those whose income benefits from pollution – even if they are the same individuals.  
Thus we expect increases in manufacturing employment are associated with increased pollution.  
We note that the predicted sign for these variables for land emissions and off-site in-state 
transfers depends on the threat of contamination from storage or release during transport.  We 
assume that transport is relatively less likely to release pollution than air and water emissions.  
Thus we expect that communities with a higher probability of sending a signal will have higher 
levels of land emissions and off-site in-state transfers as regulators force reductions in other 
pathways.   
We include three variables central to the regulatory environment of firms releasing toxic 
substances.  Because inspections may be endogenous as many of the same factors determine the 
inspection rate as emissions level (see Helland (1998) and Stafford (2001)), we include the 
inspection rate of firms in the state regulated under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act 
(RCRA).  However, as we have no instrument for inspections independent of pollution, we   11 
estimate the model with inspections as if they were exogenous.  We include two measures of the 
availability of alternative treatment methods.  We include the number of in-state RCRA treatment 
facilities (TSDs) and the percentage of all hazardous wastes treated nationally treated in the 
facility’s state.  We predict that more treatment facilities and a greater percentage of all waste 
nationwide being treated in state indicate a greater treatment capacity and will reduce air, land and 
water emissions and lower the cost of off-site in-state transfers.
11   
To account for the fact that counties are not of uniform size, we include the area of the 
county.  We account differences in pollution level caused by industry differences by constructing 
78 dummy variables based on the facility SIC code(s).
12  Finally, because we are concerned that 
emissions have declined overall in the 1987-96 period, we include year intercepts for all years after 
1987 to track the overall changes in emissions through the sample period. 
  Table 2 presents the means and standard deviations from the sample.  The mean emission 
levels for air, water, land and off-site in-state transfers are higher in border counties although the 
magnitude difference is quite small.  In other respects the samples appear similar.  The 
demographic variables between border and non-border counties do not appear systematically 
different.   
[Insert Table 2 about here.] 
3.3 Specification 
We estimate the model in logs and the coefficients are therefore elasticities.  We do not, 
however, take the natural log of the percentage variables or dummy variables.  We also include 
year intercepts.  Our facility-level control variable is the plant’s SIC code.  Unfortunately, a 
                                                                 
11 The National biennial RCRA hazardous waste report from which these variables are derived is available for 1991, 
93, 95, 97 and 99.  We utilize the nearest year as we cannot linearly interpolate before 1991.  The results are robust to 
the omission of this variable, too.   12 
number of establishment specific factors we would like to control for are not included in the TRI.  
We assume, as is usual in panel analysis, that these unobserved establishment level effects are fixed 
through time. In this case our time frame makes this assumption seem reasonable.
13  The 









=++++++ ￿￿     (5) 
where  ijt W  is the toxic release into pathway j (air, land, water, and off-site in-state shipments) from 
establishment i in year t.  Border is a discrete variable equal to one if the county in which the 
facility is located borders another state or country; Ocean equals one if the county borders an ocean 
or one of the Great Lakes.   X is the matrix of control variables for year t and establishment i,  b  is 
the matrix of coefficient estimates for control variables, a  and  g  are the coefficient estimates for 
the SIC and year controls respectively, and ci are the unobserved establishment level fixed effects.  
Finally e is the random disturbance. 
To the extent that we can assume that ci are uncorrelated with locating on a state border our 
result will be unbiased.  However it seems likely that some unobserved establishment 
characteristics are correlated with the primary variable of interest, namely border location.  For 
example, manufacturing centers might be located on state borders and hence older plants will also 
located on borders.  In other contexts we would simply include an establishment level fixed effect.  
Here, though, an establishment’s border location does not change and so we need to eliminate the 
unobserved fixed effect and still estimate the impact of border county status. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
12 Note that since some industries do not emit toxics via some pathways some SIC codes are not included in certain 
pathway specifications. 
13 This assumption is not needed for the random effect model although it is required for the Hausman-Taylor model 
(see below).   13 
4. Econometric Issues 
We have two important econometric issues in order to conduct a test of this model: sample 
selection and the potential endogenity noted above.  First, although our data consists of an 
establishment level panel, not all counties have TRI facilities located in them.  In fact, depending 
on the pathway, over one-third of all counties do not contain a single TRI facility.  To control for 
the fact that the counties represented in our data may not be a random sample, we implement Arora 
and Cason’s (1999) solution and estimate a probit model of the probability that a county has a least 
one TRI facility utilizing the pathway in question (air, water, land or off-site in-state transfers).  We 
then use the Inverse Mill’s ratio, l , as a regressor in our second-stage regressions discussed below 
to reweight the sample (Heckman 1979).  Table 3 presents the results of the first-stage probit.  As 
Arora and Cason (1999) stress it is important not to infer causation from these estimates.  
Specifically, the presence of toxic releases may be determined by a county’s demographic 
characteristics, but residents may self-select into counties without toxic releases and thus determine 
the county’s demographic composition.  
[Insert Table 3 about here.] 
  The endogenity problem requires additional treatment.  A first solution simply would be to 
estimate the model using OLS and implicitly assume no omitted variable bias.  Even if the  i c are 
uncorrelated with all of the independent variables, OLS still results in incorrect inference because 
the error terms are serially correlated (Wooldridge 2002).  A second solution is to estimate the 
model using random effects.  Unlike a fixed effects model the random effects (RE) model allows us 
to estimate the border effect, but it also assumes that the unobserved fixed effects are uncorrelated 
with the other explanatory variables.  This may not be a terrible assumption – an establishment’s   14 
unobserved characteristics may well determine its emission levels but not affect its decision to 
locate in a border county. 
  Because a convincing case can be made about the correlation between the unobserved 
establishment characteristics and border location, we choose to estimate the model so that the fixed 
effects are removed while still estimating the impact of being located on a border.
14  Our solution is 
Hausman and Taylor’s (HT) (1981) model, which reconstructs equation (5) as 
log() ijtiitiit Wzxce gb =+++,       (6) 
where  i z  are the time-invariant variables (border, ocean, county land area and SIC code) and 
it x (demographic characteristics, inspections, etc.) are variables which show some time variation.  
The variables are further subdivided into exogenous variables  1 i z  and  1 it x (for which  1 (|)0 ii Ezc=  
and  1 (|)0 iti Exc =  for all t,) and endogenous variables  2 i z  and  2 it x (for which  2 (|)0 ii Ezc „  and 
2 (|)0 iti Exc „ ). In our model  2 i z  are border and ocean location.  All other variables are treated as 
exogenous and hence  2 it x  is empty.
15  The HT estimator uses the means of the exogenous  1 it x  
variables as instruments for the endogenous  2 i z .
16 
5.  Results 
5.1. Basic Model 
  Table 4 presents the results of the estimation of equation (5) for the log of air emissions.  
Column (1) presents the OLS estimates without controls.
17  Column (2) includes all control 
variables but not the IMR ratio to correct for sample selection.  Column (3) includes the IMR but 
                                                                 
14 Ideally, we need a Hausman-like test (1978) of exogeneity.  Yet, the Hausman test compares only the exogeneity of 
time-varying regressors and hence does not address our concerns. 
15 Estimating the model treating inspections as endogenous does not change the result. 
16 See Wooldridge (2002:325-328) for an excellent treatment of the HT model.   15 
does not correct for serial correlation in the error term.  Column (4) contains the random effects 
model and IMR, which while not accounting for possible correlation between the unobserved 
establishment effects and border location does control for serial correlation in the error.  Finally 
column (5) contains the HT model estimates.   
[Insert Table 4 about here.] 
The results from column (1) to (4) estimate a border effect of between 3% and 9.8%.  
Consistent with the model’s predictions, pollution levels are higher when it is possible to export a 
portion of the pollution incidence to non-residents.  In all three cases the border coefficient is 
statistically significant.   
The HT estimates are significantly larger.  The border coefficient indicates that 
establishments located in border counties have air emissions that are 604% more air emissions than 
establishments located in non-border counties.  There are two possible reasons for the large 
increase in the magnitude of the estimated impact.  The first model is miss-specified.  However, 
even when the model is reestimated treating the inspections variable as endogenous, the coefficient 
remains of similar magnitude.  The alternative is that the OLS and random effects estimators 
seriously underestimate the impact of border status.  Because we cannot sort out these explanations 
we include both sets of estimates.
18  The HT estimate of the ocean effect suggests that ocean 
counties have air pollution that is 183% higher. 
  The results for the controls are also largely consistent with the model. In the RE and HT 
models a 1% increase in per capita income reduces air emissions by 0.35% and 0.75% respectively.   
While county population and poverty are positive and significant in the OLS estimation, they 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
17 Due to missing values of the independent variables it is usually the case that there are more observations in column 
(1) than the other models.   16 
change sign in the RE and HT models.  Minority composition is positive and significant in all 
specifications; a 1% increase increases pollution by between 0.004% and 0.01%.  This is consistent 
with the model that the decreased likelihood of a signal by residents results in higher pollution.  We 
find a similar effect from unemployment in all models but the HT specification.   
The total number of firms is negative and significant in all specifications (elasticity of -0.5) 
except the HT model; in that case it is positive, implying that a 1% increase in firms increases 
pollution by 1%.  In all models, increases in the proportion of firms with fewer than 10 employees 
decreases pollution for each firm by about 0.1% to 0.3%.  It may be that this measures 
establishment size rather than political importance.  However, the fact that this result holds in the 
HT specification suggests that the effect measures more than just average firm size because the 
firm-specific random error should include establishment size. 
  In all specifications we find that a 1% increase in the fraction of all total waste treated by 
TSDs in the state causes a 0.014% to 0.044% increase in establishment-level pollution.  We find 
inconsistent evidence on the impact of the number of TSDs in the state.  Our proxy of e, the total 
employment in manufacturing in the county, is positive and significant in all 5 specifications with a 
1% increase in total manufacturing employment causing a 0.48% to 0.939% increase in an 
establishment’s air emissions. 
  Table 5 presents the results for water emissions.  We find a magnitude of 6% (Heckman) to 
55% (HT) for the border county variable (the RE specification is not statistically significant).  The 
coefficient on ocean is significant in all of the specifications (except the OLS without controls), and 
implies that a being in a county that borders the ocean results in 40% to 70% higher water 
emissions.  
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
18 Other studies using HT models find similar increases in the magnitude of estimated coefficients of endogenous   17 
[Insert Table 5 about here.] 
Several control variables are also significant.  A 1% increase in per capita income causes a 
1.6% decrease in water emissions (although this is only significant in the HT model).  Consistent 
with our air results, we find that a 1% increase in the minority population causes a 0.003% increase 
in water emissions.  We also find that unemployment is positively related to water emission and 
that the number of small firms is negatively related. 
Table 6 presents the results for land emissions (storage).  The intuition of the model is that 
border and ocean county status represent a measure of a , the proportion of pollution that impacts 
local residents in the jurisdiction.  As such, we expect that the impact of border and ocean county 
status to be smaller for land and off-site in-state transfers than for air or water emissions.
19  In all 
cases the border coefficient on land is either negative or not significant.  In the HT model the 
coefficient statistically significant implying that border facilities have an average of 79% lower 
land emissions.  The ocean coefficient is positive and significant and of comparable magnitude to 
the air and water coefficients in all specifications. 
[Insert Table 6 about here.] 
  The land emissions model is less well estimated than the air or water regressions.  A 1% 
increase in per capita income decreases land emissions by about 1%.  Increased poverty decreases 
land emissions. However, minority composition increases land emissions. However, generally, the 
control variables are either not significant or are not the expected sign in the HT model. 
  Table 7 presents off-site in-state transfers to in-state facilities.  We measure only shipments 
to locations within the state in which the facility is located, so the incidence resulting from 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
variables.  Hausman and Taylor (1981) find a large increase in returns to schooling relative to OLS estimates. 
19 Because a potential problem is spillovers from storage facilities, the test for land emissions is less clean than for off-
site transfers.   18 
treatment and shipping accidents should fall on state residents.  We find no relation between border 
location or ocean location and the amount of off-site transfers.   
[Insert Table 7 about here.] 
We also find little relationship between county demographics and off-site in state transfers.  
There is a positive relationship for unemployment and a negative relationship for the number of 
firms (this is consistent with the model in that as e grows we should see more local disposal).  Yet, 
we find a relationship for the percentage of small firms as that in the air, water and land 
specifications.  This runs counter to the theory and suggests that this measure instead captures 
establishment size.  Several other control variables are consistent with expectations.  RCRA 
inspections are negatively related to emission levels; a 1% increase in the log inspection rate causes 
a 5% decrease in off-site transfers.  Also, an increase in the proportion of all treated waste treated 
in-state increases off-site transfers, as does an increase in the number of licensed treatment 
facilities.  
  These results are generally consistent with the model.  Border counties have higher air and 
water emissions, findings that are consistent with the claim that regulators are lenient when 
pollution incidence falls on non-residents.  We now turn to several robustness tests.  For these tests, 
the HT model presents the most restrictive assumptions and so we will confine our attention to 
border parameters estimated by that model. 
5.2. Extensions 
  Our first concern is that we do not know the actual migration patterns for air and water 
emissions.  We would like to know, for example, into which river a plant releases its emissions and 
the direction the river flows.  Our data includes over two hundred thousand emitters and mapping 
the destination of each release is prohibitive.     19 
For air emissions our solution is to examine only those counties on the eastern edge of the 
state where, due to prevailing winds, the most likely export destination is the neighboring counties.  
Table 8 presents our estimates using only eastern border counties to classify facilities. We find 
facilities in counties on the eastern edge of the state have air emission levels that are 194% higher 
than other border counties.  In short, in those border counties where we are more certain that the 
emissions are being exported to non-residents we find even higher emission by TRI facilities. 
[Insert Table 8 about here.] 
Our second concern is that the border effect depends on international border status.  This 
would not per se contradict the jurisdiction theory; finding that international borders drive the 
results would indicate that the national government has a role in jurisdictional conflicts.  We 
estimate three specifications (presented in Table 9).  The exclusion of facilities located in counties 
bordering Mexico, Canada, or both does not change the results.  In all cases find that air emissions 
and water emissions are higher in establishments located on state borders while land and off-site 
transfers are not. 
[Insert Table 9 about here.] 
  Finally, Table 10 provides the results of an HT where each model includes only facilities 
located in one of the ten EPA regions.  The first reason for this is that county size varies greatly 
across regions.  EPA Region IX has an average land area of 4062; Regions IV (south central) and I 
(New England) have land areas of 502 and 938.  A second reason is political.  One of the purposes 
of the EPA Regions is to oversee just the sorts of jurisdiction conflicts created by facilities located 
in border areas.  It is possible that some regions are better at (or more likely to) mitigating these 
problems than others.  Table 10 does not indicate that Region I’s counties are driving this result; 
the border effect is consistently positive and significant in the air emission specification.  In those   20 
areas where it is not (Regions I, III, and IX) only in Region I do we find a negative and significant 
coefficient. We find similar evidence for water emissions; in three of the ten Regions the border 
effect is positive and significant – it is negative and significant in Region 6.   
  The results are more varied for land and off-site transfers.  Only in Region V is the border 
effect for land emissions significant and positive.  For off-site transfers, Regions II, V, and VII 
have negative coefficients while that for Region IV is positive.   
[Insert Table 10 about here.] 
There appears to be no consistent pattern form land or off-site transfers.  For air releases the 
pattern seems much clearer.  In most Regions, the average facility emits more chemicals if it is 
located in a county that borders another state.  There is still considerable variation in the effect 
across Regions – a fact we leave to further research. 
6.  Conclusion 
  The results presented in this study suggest that jurisdiction matters in determining the level 
of pollution produced. As Oates (2001) explains, local environmental protection is a public good 
with spillovers and communities have incentives to export externalities.  The benefits of the 
production in terms of income stay within the state while the costs in terms of pollution are borne 
(at least in part) by residents of another political jurisdiction.  In estimating a model of the 
determinants of facility emissions, our findings indicate that facilities located in counties bordering 
other states have significantly higher levels of toxic releases into the air and water.  Their releases 
shipped off-site or stored on land show no systematic significant difference. 
  It is not clear what if anything could be done to correct this difference.  One of the central 
reasons for a national environmental policy is to avoid externality exporting.  In a strong sense, the 
solution depends on how these externalities are exported.  One possibility is that states are less   21 
stringent in their enforcement of pollution control laws near the borders of their states.  While this 
is possible, we believe it is unlikely in this case.  Because the TRI data are self-reported, facilities 
out of compliance with their permitted levels of pollution are unlikely to voluntarily report this 
even if they faced lower regulatory sanctions.  Instead, it is more likely that states write less 
restrictive permits or grandfather near the border. 
One wrinkle, however, is that an efficient emission standard would not be uniform as 
communities almost certainly differ in their willingness to pay.  Oates (2001) points out that even if 
local communities free-ride it is unclear if the deadweight loss created by that free-riding is greater 
than the deadweight loss created by uniform national standards.  In terms of Figure 1 we are not 
estimating sE, the efficient level of pollution. Further we have no idea whether the national 
standard, sF, is closer to the efficient level than the local standard even if the national standard is 
not uniform. In sum, we cannot answer Oates’ most pressing question, 
“…if there is a race to the bottom, we are left with a choice between to alternatives: 
suboptimal local decisions on environmental quality or inefficient uniform national 
standards.  And which of these two leads to a higher level of social welfare is, in principal 
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Table 1: Magat, et al. comparative statics: effect on the stringency of regulations 
 
Parameter increased  Sign associated with change in s
* 
n (number of citizens)  - 
m (number of firms)  + 
e (relative strength of signal)  + 
() h ￿  (probability of firm support)  + 
() f ￿  (probability of citizen support  - 
() t ￿  (compliance cost)  + 
a  (pollution damage)  - 
Source: Magat, et al. (1986:63) 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable  All Establishments  Establishments located in border counties 
Log(air releases)



















Border  .450201 
(.4975149) 
 










































Log(number of manufacturing establishments)




Log(number of plants with 10 employees)




















(1) Toxic Release Inventory 
(2)Census and City County Data book and census, various years 
(3) RCRA Info 
(4) National biennial RCRA Hazardous Waste Report 1991, 93, 95, 97, 99  
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Table 3: Probability of hazardous waste releases by medium 
 








Border County  0.035*  0.246***  0.117***  -0.005 
  (0.021)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.020) 
Ocean  -0.242***  0.229***  -0.029  -0.487*** 
  (0.048)  (0.038)  (0.038)  (0.046) 
Log(PCI)  -0.865***  -0.540***  -0.150*  -1.134*** 
  (0.091)  (0.088)  (0.090)  (0.097) 
Log(population)  0.241***  0.299***  0.627***  0.073 
  (0.045)  (0.043)  (0.049)  (0.046) 
Percent of residents in poverty  -0.036***  -0.017***  -0.013***  -0.035*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Percent of county residents who are a minority  0.003***  0.003***  0.002***  -0.001** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log(population density)  0.126***  0.062***  -0.286***  0.335*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.015) 
Percent of county residents who are unemployed  -0.053**  -0.036*  0.160***  -0.262*** 
  (0.022)  (0.020)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Log(number of manufacturing establishments)  -0.647***  -1.017***  -0.809***  -0.573*** 
  (0.048)  (0.049)  (0.052)  (0.050) 
Percentage of firms with fewer than 10 employees  -0.018***  -0.015***  -0.025***  -0.015*** 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log(inspection rate)  -0.160***  -0.089***  -0.066***  -0.135*** 
  (0.014)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.014) 
Percent of all RCRA hazardous waste treated in state  -0.003**  -0.004***  -0.001  -0.004*** 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log(total number of in-state RCRA facilities)-TSDs  0.013  0.038***  -0.001  0.025* 
  (0.013)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.013) 
Log(total employment in manufacturing)  1.042***  1.103***  0.852***  1.025*** 
  (0.033)  (0.037)  (0.040)  (0.035) 
Constant  3.251***  -0.681  -6.262***  7.199*** 
  (1.107)  (1.049)  (1.086)  (1.164) 
Observations  28759  28759  28759  28759 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
       
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1%   27 
Table 4: The determinates of facility Log(air) emissions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








Border County  0.029**  0.098***  0.098***  0.085***  6.041*** 
  (0.013)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.031)  (0.258) 
Ocean  -0.104***  0.315***  0.314***  0.340***  1.835*** 
  (0.018)  (0.022)  (0.022)  (0.047)  (0.074) 
Log(PCI)    -0.122  -0.089  -0.213*  -0.754*** 
    (0.080)  (0.082)  (0.115)  (0.126) 
Log(Land Area)    0.015  0.018  0.174***  1.312 
    (0.044)  (0.044)  (0.020)  (2.106) 
Log(population)    0.001  0.001  -0.354***  -3.265 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.073)  (2.110) 
Percent of residents in poverty    0.004*  0.006**  -0.015***  -0.020*** 
    (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Percent of county residents who are a minority    0.004***  0.004***  0.003***  0.011*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.0001)  (0.001) 
Log(population density)    -0.139***  -0.137***  0.001  0.630 
    (0.043)  (0.043)  (0.000)  (2.106) 
Percent of county residents who are unemployed    0.448***  0.453***  1.534***  -0.142* 
    (0.021)  (0.021)  (0.156)  (0.086) 
Log(number of manufacturing establishments)    -0.592***  -0.571***  -0.595***  0.992*** 
    (0.057)  (0.058)  (0.091)  (0.108) 
Percentage of firms with fewer than 10 employees    -0.014***  -0.014***  -0.019***  -0.038*** 
    (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log(inspection rate)    0.009  0.009  0.010  0.003 
    (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.014) 
Percent of all RCRA hazardous waste treated in state    0.014***  0.014***  0.003**  0.044*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Log(total number of in-state RCRA facilities)-TSDs    -0.082***  -0.082***  0.018  0.249*** 
    (0.009)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.018) 
Log(total employment in manufacturing)    0.482***  0.453***  0.716***  0.939*** 
    (0.043)  (0.047)  (0.066)  (0.075) 
l       -0.087  0.642***  0.161** 
      (0.054)  (0.079)  (0.075) 
Observations  191697  182231  182231  182231  182231 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 5: The determinates of facility Log(water) emissions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








Border County  0.134***  0.139***  0.064*  0.059  0.547** 
  (0.038)  (0.039)  (0.035)  (0.081)  (0.254) 
Ocean  -0.007  0.474***  0.406***  0.480***  0.704*** 
  (0.053)  (0.063)  (0.066)  (0.119)  (0.193) 
Log(PCI)    0.019  0.326  -0.356  -1.699*** 
    (0.232)  (0.250)  (0.348)  (0.530) 
Log(Land Area)    0.001  0.001  0.047  -0.021 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.056)  (0.081) 
Log(population)    0.311**  0.279**  -0.271  -0.353 
    (0.126)  (0.127)  (0.195)  (0.340) 
Percent of residents in poverty    0.010  0.022***  0.016  -0.013 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.010)  (0.016) 
Percent of county residents who are a minority    0.004***  0.003**  0.003**  0.003** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Log(population density)    -0.060*  -0.078**  0.001  0.001 
    (0.033)  (0.034)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Percent of county residents who are unemployed    1.342***  1.376***  2.351***  3.566*** 
    (0.058)  (0.059)  (0.453)  (0.313) 
Log(number of manufacturing establishments)    -0.417***  -0.062  0.307  0.290 
    (0.149)  (0.182)  (0.290)  (0.496) 
Percentage of firms with fewer than 10 employees    -0.042***  -0.035***  -0.036***  -0.049*** 
    (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.013) 
Log(inspection rate)    0.115***  0.130***  0.027  0.089 
    (0.032)  (0.032)  (0.038)  (0.062) 
Percent of all RCRA hazardous waste treated in state    0.002  0.002  0.002  0.004 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.007) 
Log(total number of in-state RCRA facilities)-TSDs    -0.109***  -0.115***  -0.017  -0.022 
    (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.037)  (0.066) 
Log(total employment in manufacturing)    -0.066  -0.481***  -0.327  -0.083 
    (0.114)  (0.168)  (0.255)  (0.459) 
l       -0.612***  -0.320  0.037 
      (0.182)  (0.267)  (0.237) 
Observations  26221  24816  24816  24816  24816 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 6: The determinates of facility Log(land) emissions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








Border County  -0.041  0.005  -0.035  0.035  -0.789** 
  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.053)  (0.080)  (0.361) 
Ocean  0.041  0.486***  0.499***  0.269**  0.323*** 
  (0.074)  (0.085)  (0.085)  (0.125)  (0.100) 
Log(PCI)    -1.112***  -0.923***  -0.343  -0.926*** 
    (0.295)  (0.303)  (0.374)  (0.344) 
Log(Land Area)    0.339***  0.284***  0.216***  0.082 
    (0.037)  (0.042)  (0.060)  (0.173) 
Log(population)    -0.051  -0.134  0.072  0.000 
    (0.149)  (0.152)  (0.213)  (0.000) 
Percent of residents in poverty    -0.044***  -0.035***  -0.015  -0.022* 
    (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Percent of county residents who are a minority    0.012***  0.012***  0.009***  0.008*** 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003) 
Log(population density)    0.001  0.001  0.001  -0.066 
    (0.001  (0.001  (0.001  (0.167) 
Percent of county residents who are unemployed    0.493***  0.456***  1.857***  0.372 
    (0.075)  (0.076)  (0.515)  (0.230) 
Log(number of manufacturing establishments)    -0.268  0.046  0.002  0.291 
    (0.190)  (0.221)  (0.304)  (0.257) 
Percentage of firms with fewer than 10 employees    -0.044***  -0.030***  -0.018*  -0.011 
    (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.012) 
Log(inspection rate)    0.093**  0.109***  0.063  0.104*** 
    (0.039)  (0.039)  (0.043)  (0.037) 
Percent of all RCRA hazardous waste treated in state    0.010***  0.009***  0.005  0.004 
    (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Log(total number of in-state RCRA facilities)-TSDs    -0.045  -0.039  -0.049  -0.053 
    (0.033)  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.034) 
Log(total employment in manufacturing)    0.000  -0.361*  -0.377  -0.665** 
    (0.143)  (0.194)  (0.250)  (0.281) 
l       -0.663***  -0.282  -1.118*** 
      (0.239)  (0.316)  (0.417) 
Observations  16458  15508  15508  15508  15508 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 7: The determinates of facility Log(off-site) emissions 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 








Border County  -0.062***  -0.018  -0.018  -0.040  -0.327 
  (0.022)  (0.023)  (0.023)  (0.039)  (0.332) 
Ocean  0.029  0.090***  0.091***  0.086  -0.004 
  (0.027)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.058)  (0.105) 
Log(PCI)    -0.023  0.023  -0.493**  -0.094 
    (0.139)  (0.143)  (0.204)  (0.187) 
Log(Land Area)    0.174**  0.177**  -0.046  0.307 
    (0.077)  (0.077)  (0.028)  (1.450) 
Log(population)    0.001  0.001  0.077  -0.068 
    (0.001  (0.001  (0.117)  (1.459) 
Percent of residents in poverty    0.010**  0.012**  -0.018***  -0.001 
    (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Percent of county residents who are a minority    -0.003**  -0.003**  0.005**  0.000 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
Log(population density)    0.226***  0.226***  0.001  0.373 
    (0.076)  (0.076)  (0.001  (1.450) 
Percent of county residents who are unemployed    0.168***  0.176***  1.838***  0.461*** 
    (0.035)  (0.035)  (0.276)  (0.116) 
Log(number of manufacturing establishments)    -0.423***  -0.394***  -0.172  -0.543*** 
    (0.101)  (0.103)  (0.151)  (0.181) 
Percentage of firms with fewer than 10 employees    -0.029***  -0.028***  -0.021***  -0.022*** 
    (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Log(inspection rate)    -0.100***  -0.102***  -0.032  -0.052** 
    (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Percent of all RCRA hazardous waste treated in state    0.019***  0.020***  0.011***  0.013*** 
    (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.003) 
Log(total number of in-state RCRA facilities)-TSDs    0.135***  0.134***  0.091***  0.108*** 
    (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.021)  (0.022) 
Log(total employment in manufacturing)    0.155**  0.115  0.093  0.223* 
    (0.078)  (0.083)  (0.113)  (0.118) 
l       -0.123  0.264**  0.154 
      (0.091)  (0.124)  (0.102) 
Observations  61075  59211  59211  59211  59211 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1%   31 
Table 8: The determinates of facility Log(air) emissions including an eastern border 
interaction 
 
  Eastern Border Counties 
Establishment located in Border County  5.686*** 
  (0.257) 
Establishment located in county on eastern border of the state  1.949*** 
  (0.268) 
Observations  182231 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
 
 
Table 9: The determinates of facility Log emissions excluding counties which border Mexico 
(Panel A) and Canada and Mexico (Panel B) 
 
Panel A  No Mexican Border 
log(air)  5.841*** 
  (0.243) 
Observations  180774 
log(water)  0.359** 
  (0.146) 
Observations  24748 
log(land)  -0.691* 
  (0.373) 
Observations  15363 
log(Off-site Transfers)  -0.291 
  (0.320) 
Observations  58606 
Panel B  No International Borders 
log(air)  6.005*** 
  (0.249) 
Observations  180188 
log(water)  0.365** 
  (0.145) 
Observations  24567 
log(land)  -0.582 
  (0.377) 
Observations  15264 
log(Off-site Transfers)  -0.225 
  (0.326) 
Observations  58515 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
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Table 10: The determinates of facility Log emissions by EPA Region 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  log(air)  log(water)  log(land)  log(Off-site) 
Region 1  -0.462*  -0.717  -0.012  -0.463 
  (0.279)  (0.623)  (0.709)  (0.516) 
Observations  12073  1526  639  4036 
Region 2  1.766***  -1.367  -0.622  -1.732*** 
  (0.481)  (0.862)  (0.816)  (0.607) 
Observations  13844  1702  778  5258 
Region 3  -0.518  -0.007  -0.605  2.190** 
  (0.415)  (0.511)  (0.792)  (0.918) 
Observations  15912  3119  1366  3479 
Region 4  1.752***  0.753***  -0.483  2.104*** 
  (0.257)  (0.243)  (0.311)  (0.513) 
Observations  37190  6231  3683  8167 
Region 5  0.949***  0.954**  1.807***  -0.705* 
  (0.219)  (0.406)  (0.614)  (0.397) 
Observations  52721  5698  3422  21326 
Region 6  1.249***  -0.917***  -0.330  1.244** 
  (0.314)  (0.350)  (0.534)  (0.578) 
Observations  16510  3414  2310  6327 
Region 7  2.579***  2.102**  0.481  -1.797* 
  (0.679)  (1.034)  (0.717)  (1.048) 
Observations  8779  964  982  1389 
Region 8  2.956***  1.704  0.424  -0.399 
  (0.963)  (1.185)  (0.976)  (1.634) 
Observations  4002  402  639  856 
Region 9  0.400  3.455  0.332  -0.948 
  (0.374)  (2.234)  (1.409)  (0.733) 
Observations  15671  806  983  7049 
Region 10  2.329***  0.173  -0.370  -0.801 
  (0.645)  (0.684)  (0.780)  (1.702) 
Observations  5529  954  706  1324 
Standard errors in parentheses 
All models include year and SIC controls. 
* significant at 10% 
** significant at 5% 
*** significant at 1% 
Region 1 - Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  
Region 2 - New Jersey and New York  
Region 3 - Delaware, Maryland, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and West Virginia.  
Region 4 - Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee.  
Region 5 - Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  
Region 6 - Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Texas.  
Region 7 - Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Nebraska.  
Region 8 - Colorado, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming.  
Region 9 - Arizona, California, Hawaii, and Nevada.  
Region 10 Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, and Washington.  
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Figure 1: Federal, local and economically efficient optimal pollution standards 
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